Words Work: Shaping Ontario's Same-Sex Benefits Debate by Latchford, Frances
Word's Work 
Shaping Ontario's Same-Sex Benefits Debate 
by Frances Latcbfird lifestyles that are inevitably 
heterosexually defined. 
Gtartic&examincf'impllctidCo~w Ultimately, language is ideological 
drs mots sur h droits et h lib& h because, as a combination of mean- 
ttres humaim. L'auteure sepmche m ingful signs, it is determined by and 
particuliersur ksdroits Ugauv drs cou- reliant upon "common agreement 
between speaker 
and listener" 
(Nilson 43). Com- 
The creation of the new queer specijic category mon agreement . . 
exbibits how common dh/agreement by larger and about a word's 
meaning can be 
more powe@l groups ofpeople determines more constituted by a 
. -  - 
than just what bordc will mean. 
pks homoscxuc&pour illwtrer f'impact 
idiohgique que b moa ont sur nos 
droits et dans nos vies. 
In the beginning was the Word 
and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God. (Em- 
phasis mine) 
The Holy Bibk, St. John's 
Gospel, Chapter 1, Verse 1 
With the likes ofwhom are our words 
working? What lies hidden in the 
economy of the word and how does 
it propagate ideologies that "form" 
queer lives? What forceslvalues do 
we, queer or otherwise, perpetuate 
with the words we agree to use? In the 
absence ofphysical human action the 
sign is a capable and violent mode of 
domination, but does this mean that 
we must inevitably be manipulated 
by the word at every moment? Can 
we knowingly choose not to partici- 
pate with the proliferation of ideol- 
ogy in language? These questions in 
mind, what follows is: a discussion of 
how words work us over ideologically 
specifically in relation to Ontario's 
same-sex benefits debate, an explora- 
tion of how to rethink the seemingly 
innocuous effect of the sign in order 
to resist its force, and finally some 
consideration of whether access to 
the word "spouse" commits queers to 
mass populous or 
by only a few. 
\Jirhat matters in 
meaning is that 
there are people who can and do agree 
to use a sign in specific ways. For 
instance, in the world at large "devi- 
ous" means "unscrupulous" and "in- 
sincere" yet amongst the kids in my 
childhood neighbourhood "devious" 
meant the ultimate in cool (Sykes 
282). So if you had pulled off a mas- 
terful scam on your parents or if you 
were showing offyour new bike some- 
one would inevitably exclaim "devi- 
ous" and, regardless ofparental assur- 
ances that that was not what the word 
meant, we all knew and agreed it was 
cool. The significance ofthis example 
is simply that it illustrates the fluid 
contextual reality of meaning and the 
arbitrary relationship between sign 
and signified. Specifically, no sign is 
primordially destined to its signified. 
Instead, every idea or concept signi- 
fied by a word is ultimately and only 
initiated into language relative to 
human choice and agreement, and it 
- 
is maintained only in practice. 
In order to understand as best we 
can the ideological force of common 
agreement on knowledge, let's con- 
sider a brief rumination on truth and 
language put forth by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, "If language is to be a 
means ofcommunication there must 
be agreement not only in definitions 
but also (queer as &may sound) in 
judgments" (88e). 
In other words, we communicate 
and know according to whatever 
words have been d, via judgment, 
to mean; and these meanings (or 
knowledges) &ect and shape our lives 
insofar as we continue andlor com- 
monly agree to use them in any pre- 
designated manner. For instance, in 
Ontario, Bill 167 challenged the ex- 
clusive form of life that "spouse" sig- 
nifies. In the original draft of the 
same-sex benefits Bill the word 
"spouse" was actually used to signifl 
gay and lesbian relationships. With 
the second reading of the Bill how- 
ever "spouse" had been replaced with 
"domestic partner." Toronto Sun re- 
porter Heather Bird explains, 
The first change in the equality 
Rights Statute Law Amendment 
will add a new category of "do- 
mestic partner," leaving both 
"spousen and "marital statusn 
with their current definitions. 
The term "domestic partner" will 
apply in law to all same-sex con- 
jugal relationships. uune 9, 
1994) 
The creation of the new queer spe- 
cific category exhibits how common 
dislagreement by larger and more 
powerful groups ofpeople determines 
more than just what words will mean 
because that agreement is what effec- 
tively shaped the lives and rights of 
queers. You see, if gays and lesbians 
had been commonly judged as legally 
entitled to use the word "spousen 
they too would have gained legal ac- 
cess to all the rights and entitlements 
that "spouses," i.e. married 
heterosexuals, currently enjoy. The 
strategic and implicit provision en- 
tailed by the new category "domestic 
partnern being that it serves as a sepa- 
rate and distinct basis on which rights 
may or may not be guaranteed to 
queers. A basis which is clearly unlike 
(hence the need for a new category) 
the already established basis on which 
VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2 65 
"spousen guarantees rights and enti- this process of arbitration lies in every 
tlements to married heterosexuals. naive tendency wherein we trust (in 
The role judgment plays in lan- practice) that these linguistic deci- 
page is hrther discernible when you sions are indeed only arbitrary in 
begin to question what really moti- that they are never or are only infre- 
vated the decision to differentiate quently wi1lM.l This in mind, "do- 
"domestic partner" from the category mestic partner" i a product of the 
"spouse." The short answer is clearly social control elicited by the judg- 
homo-hatred! The long answer in- ments that categorization and thus 
volves understanding that words are language entails. Therefore, as long 
inevitably linked to control and con- as gays and lesbians remain excluded 
from the category 
"spouse," queers 
wr'll assuredly 
As long US gays and lesbians remain excludedfiom never become un- 
- - 
the category '?pourr, " queers will arsuredly ncver equivocally eligi- 
ble for the rights become eligible for the rights and entitlements that and entit~ements 
"spouse" legally provi&sfir married beterosexua L. that uspousen le- 
gally provides for 
trol is always contingent upon cat- 
egories. David Theo Goldberg ex- 
pands, 
Social psychologists and philoso- 
phers commonly hold that plac- 
ing sensory data under catego- 
ries is central to human experi- 
ence. Application of categories 
enables human cognition by the 
ordering of data that we would 
otherwise find chaotic. The data 
organized are so large that they 
would be impossible to assimi- 
late if considered monadidly. 
Categorizing simplifies the com- 
plexity ofthe surroundingworld. 
It condenses potentially over- 
whelming data to manageable 
proportions, it enables identifi- 
cation, it serves ultimately as a 
guide to action, and in moder- 
nity it extends to human beings 
a sense of social control, of being 
in control. (121) 
Let's thus assume categories are a 
prerequisite to social control. Fur- 
ther, assume judgments are the deci- 
sions that are m& regarding what is 
included (as like) and excluded (as 
unlike) withinlout a category. Judg- 
ment is now the means of social con- 
trol that manifests inlas the word. As 
a result, the challenge posed to us by 
m a r r i e d  
heterosexuals. In 
other words, the common agreement 
amongst heterosexuals which mani- 
fested in the judgment that it was 
necessary to create "domestic part- 
ner," in order to pass Bill 167, really 
did order and effect the right to free- 
dom of every queer in Ontario. Re- 
gardless of whether the Bill was suc- 
cessfil or not, "domestic partnern is 
the result of an exclusion whose prac- 
tice will outlive Bill 167; and if ever 
a new bill is presented don't be sur- 
prised if the word "spouse" is never 
mentioned. 
Key to understanding how ideol- 
ogy works us over with words is the 
realization that many words we use 
contain residual judgments ofwhich 
we are unaware. Traditionally, lin- 
guistics has tended to hold that only 
some words have "built-in judg- 
ments" which "communicate simul- 
taneowly a fact and a judgment on the 
fact" (Hayakawa 89). Epithetical 
words such as "thief," "hooker," and 
"faggot" represent these types of 
words; wherein by referring to some- 
one as a "thief' you judge them, 
because the meaning of the word 
literally summons up judgmental 
connotations about the individual in 
relation to the right and wrong of 
stealing. This otherwise limited no- 
tion ofUbuilt-in judgments" however 
is extremely useful ifwe imagine fir- 
ther that intrinsic judgments are in- 
deed characteristic of all signs. Spe- 
cifically, a judgment is passed with 
the initiation of every sign and it is 
literally built into the sign precisely 
andsimply because it (the judgment) 
is what poses the limits of what that 
sign will mean. 
Of course, every sign's intrinsic 
judgments are subject to change over 
time along with meaning but again 
significant change is only possible 
where common agreement is attained 
and maintained in practice. For in- 
stance, I've often heard other gays 
and lesbians warmly and jovially re- 
fer to their lovers as "spouse" or "hus- 
band" or "wife." Amongst ourselves 
these words already convey clear and 
quick meanings about our relation- 
ships. In particular contexts these 
otherwise heterosexual words can be 
used effectively in a Foucauldian 
manner wherein they do serve as a 
"reverse discourse" (Foucault 1980, 
101). 
However, beyond queer contexts 
these words will tend to retain prima- 
rily straight and narrow meanings 
because those outside smaller specific 
contexts agrrr that the word means 
something else.2 Consequently, as 
Marion Boyd "said she would con- 
sider adding the term 'domestic part- 
ner' to the Bill, which she also said 
would not alter the present definition 
of 'spouse'" (Bird, June 7,1994)' she 
did so because common agreement 
continued to be primarily aligned 
with the heterosexist judgments that 
"spouse" entails in "straight" con- 
texts. "Domestic partner" was thus 
automatically ascribed a homo-hat- 
ing judgment precisely because its 
creation was solely contingent upon a 
decision that did not allow the word 
"spousen to be used (i.e., practiced) to 
signify gaytlesbian relationships. The 
effect of the change being that if 
queers also agreed to use "domestic 
partnern they too would become 
complicit in the heterosexist ideology 
that excluded them from "spouse" in 
the first place. 
Before discussing firther how lin- 
guistic practices make us complicit in 
judgments, and thus ideology, let's 
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expand on how the formation of the 
boundary of a word's meaning is 
constituted by "similarity" or like- 
ness which in turn initiates and im- 
presses judgments upon the sign. In 
Competing Discourses David Lee 
writes, 
... our world is structured 
through the relationships that 
we establish between different 
situations, through our percep- 
tions of similarity. It is this net- 
work of relationships that con- 
stitutes the fabric of our cogni- 
tivesystem, that makes ourworld 
"thinkable." Moreover, these 
perceptions of similarity oper- 
ate through language. (66) (Em- 
phasis mine) 
In other words, likeness is a rela- 
tion, socially produced in language, 
that enables the ordering ofthe world 
around us in specific ways. Speaking 
categorically then, the boundary of a 
word's meaning makes our world 
"thinkable" because it groups like 
with like to the extent that categories 
organize and name things that are 
deemed the same.3 
A primary example of how like 
relations are constructed by words is 
nicely represented by Sesame Street's 
like segment. You know the song, 
"One Of  These Things Is Not Like 
The Other," where four items are 
depicted on the screen and your child 
has to gwss which is the single ob- 
jectlsignified that is unlike the rest. 
The point of the game is to teach 
your child how to conceptualize and 
name what is the same about the 
objects presented. For instance, 
amongst three shoes and a boot your 
child will learn to distinguish the 
"shoes" from the "boot." What this 
lesson will inevitably neglect to men- 
tion however is that while like rela- 
tions may occur between objects1 
signified5 this does not necessitate 
an objective equality between them 
as long as unlike relations simulta- 
neously exist. By demanding that 
your child look for likeness this game 
potentially effects the relations slhe 
will begin to deem important 
amongst the objects signified. What 
your child isn't learning therefore is 
that slhe is being persuaded to focus 
on only one relation, highlighted 
above all others that are imlpossible, 
between the objectslsignifieds pre- 
sented. The problem is, the empha- 
sis on a singular like now begins to 
serve as a standard against which 
unlike is judged. For instance, the 
boot's likenesses become immaterial 
and imperceptible as soon as it is 
excluded, as a "boot," from the 
"shoes." In essence, this exercise 
teaches children not to perceive mul- 
tiple relations of likeness. Instead, 
they learn to value only some rela- 
tions that signs name as like, while 
constituting all the other possible 
likenesses between things that are sig- 
nified by different signs as unlike. 
The problem the word poses for 
all of us therefore is that it encour- 
ages us to deal with meaning solely 
as Sesame Street savants. Signs liter- 
ally demand that we notice, and 
thereby value, few andor singular 
unllike relations. All words mean ex- 
clusively and it is in our surrender in 
interpretative practice to notions of 
meaning as primordially fued that 
words will work us over ideologi- 
cally. For you see, a sign not only 
invites us to judge as insignificant all 
possible likenesses shared bef~,cen 
things it includes and excludes, it 
also encourages us, simultaneously, 
The boundary for "marriedn is het- 
erosexual union because it is a legal 
option ~rovided only for partners of 
the opposite sex. For "heterosexual," 
it is "(person) characterized by (the 
normal) attraction to the opposite 
sex" (Sykes 504). Queers are unlike 
spouses because they are n o d y  at- 
tracted to the same sex and cannot 
be legally married. The boundary of 
"spouse" is thus literally determined 
by only two like relations, one of 
which is merely a socially consuucted 
legal right (marriage) granted by vir- 
tue of being heterosexual-like. Eligi- 
bility for spouse-hood therefore re- 
ally only turns on a single likeness-- 
heterosexuality. The certainty that 
queers are frequently spouse-like is 
thus rendered invisible and impossi- 
ble regardless of our relationships, 
children, joint accounts, shared 
homes, anniversary parties, and h i -  
lies (etc.) because of the difference 
that is made of our sexuality. It is, 
therefore, precisely the exclusivity of 
this word's meaning that obfuscates 
the import of the fact that a sole like 
relation (heterosexuality), 
foregrounded from a multiplicity of 
other possible like relations, has con- 
tinuously been used as the only basis 
upon which queers are judged ineli- 
gible for the legal rights and entitle- 
ments spouse-hood provides. 
The thinkability of our world is 
not by necessity contingent upon 
The certainty that queers are frequently spouse- 
like is thus rendered invisiblr and impossiblr regardlrrr 
of our rekztionships, children, joint accounts, shared 
homes, anniversary parties, andfamilies. 
to ignore the di$rrences between the 
things it signifies as like. In this 
myopic manner, words thus serve 
both in making the world "think- 
able" and as strategies for social con- 
trol and domination. For instance, 
the like standard for the meaning 
boundary of "spouse" is that all 
spouses are "husbands or wives," i.e., 
married heterosexuals (Sykes 1 1 10). 
perceptions of likeness, instead, like- 
ness has been strategically constructed 
as the standard against which cat- 
egorical eligibility is judged. What 
therefore makes us complicit in ide- 
ology where signs are concerned is the 
extent to which we unconsciously or 
unconditionally accept the "think- 
ing" or judgments that are implicit in 
the words we use. For instance, not 
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every heterosexual who opposed en- son, only heterosexist reason, can all that the signified will be and fur- 
-. 
larging the definition of "spouse" to 
include queers did so because they 
wished to deny gays and lesbians ac- 
cess to the same rights they enjoyed. 
Many simply believed that spouse 
"just means married" which gays and 
lesbians (by chance?) don't happen to 
be. In fact, Marion Boyd further rein- 
forced what precious little manypro- 
gayllesbian heterosexuals made ofthe 
move to create the new category "do- 
defend a-decision that bars gays and 
lesbians from using "spow." 
The very nature of language, i.e., 
that it is contingent on common agree- 
ment, is what makes signs inevitably 
susceptible to ideology. The unform- 
nate result being that signs determine 
the world we know without ever nec- 
essarily or frequently representing the 
"real." In other words, whenever 
signifieds are misrecognized as equal 
- 
ther imposes limits on what it can be 
or on how it will be known. This is no 
great dilemma of domination when 
wearc dealingwith "shoes" vs. "boots" 
but the word's force is significantly 
different if we begin to talk about 
"spouses" vs. "domestic partners." 
When people honestly don't under- 
stand Bill 167's semantic debate be- 
cause "spouse just means married," 
they are literally confusing the sign (a 
Bill 167 Demonstration, Toronto, June 9th, 1994. Photo: Mary Anne Coffey. 
mestic partner" when she stated, 
"[tlhere ought to be some way in 
which we can find a consensus if all 
we are talking about is semantics" 
(Bird, June 7, 1994). The signifi- 
cance of deflating the issue to a queer 
semantic quibble is that it prevents 
those who belittled the disagreement 
from becoming conscious of their 
own complicity in denying queers 
access to particular rights and entitle- 
ments. In other words, no "real" rea- 
merely because they have a sign in 
common, that sign grants only a par- 
tial view unto the possibility of each 
individual signified. So, even though 
each signified r j  simultaneously dis- 
tinct from other signifieds, it will be 
entitled to recognition only insofar as 
it shares precisely enough similarities 
to concur with a given sign's exclu- 
sive meaning. The relationship be- 
tween sign and signified is ideological 
because the sign doesn't account for 
reflection of reality) with the signi- 
fied (reality).4 By accepting the limits 
of the sign unconditionally one ac- 
cepts asocially constructed judgment 
regarding the significance of hetero- 
sexual vs. queer relationships, a sig- 
nificance that is not "real" outside of 
language. As one exdudes all other 
relationships that are not deemed 
equal to the limits of meaning of 
"spousen they also limit their knowl- 
edge of reality. Essentially, they be- 
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come incapable of knowing the sig- 
nificance ofgayllesbian relationships 
precisely because the words which 
convey that significance are not used 
to sign$ those relationships. For 
instance, a heterosexual marriage of 
convenience is wholly different from 
a loving long-term companionship 
between two men, yet "spouse" will 
obfuscate the significance of that dif- 
ference and legally reward the mar- 
ried couple. "Domestic partner" sim- 
ply does not connote the type of 
commitment that "spouse" does, nor 
will it over time because the exclusion 
it resulted from was founded upon an 
implicit inequaftty in meaning. 
Havingcome this far, nowwe must 
ask: will there be hidden costs for 
queers if they gain the right to don 
the word "spouse"? For example, costs 
wherein only "respectable" queers 
who agree to mimic nuclear family 
values might be recognized as eligible 
for spousal benefits. Or worse, what 
if Liberal and Conservative gayslles- 
bians used their new "in-group" sta- 
tus against other queers because they 
disapproved of the latter's lifestyles? 
There is no question that these possi- 
bilities are real. In fact, they are al- 
ready illustrated by pride day debates 
wherein certain gay/lesbian factions 
would gladly ban drag queens or 
leather clad queers from parades be- 
cause they supposedly give the (so- 
called) community a bad name. Real 
as they may be, however, don't forget 
that ifaccess to the wordweregranted, 
its new definition would still and 
always only be a product of common 
agreement. In other words, "selling- 
out" is not constituted by the desire 
to "sit at front of the bus," instead it 
turns on the inlexclusive decisions 
we will make in order to delregulate 
the access ofothers once we get there. 
The question then is not, does want- 
ing access to "spouse" mean you are 
a "sell-out," instead itis, amongst the 
queers who want access, who is 
heterosexually identified and how can 
those of us who are not prepare to 
protect ourselves and our rights from 
being defined by those who are, if 
and when access is granted? 
Once inside the category "spouse," 
queers would have access to redefin- 
ing the limits of its meaning. Change 
however will be determined by the 
battles queers are willing to fight on 
behalfofeach other, but as important 
as this question may be it is aquestion 
of ethics which is distinct from the 
questions at hand. Specifically, do 
queers need access to the category 
"spouse" in order to be ensured equal 
rights and must access be determined 
by queers being the same? My answer 
is yes, queers need access, and no, to 
be a queer "spouse" doesn't mean 
that our rights and entitlements must 
turn only on the extent to which our 
relationships are the same unless we 
agree to that definition. For instance, 
non-traditional heterosexual couples 
have pushed for mechanisms like com- 
mon-law marriage that include them 
within the category "spouse" in spite 
of their differences, i.e., that they are 
not married formally. And recently 
eligibility requirements have changed, 
wherein heterosexuals now need only 
to live together for one year, vs. the 
inceptional ten, before they are le- 
gally recognized as entitled, under 
family and tax law, to the same rights 
enjoyed by traditionally marriedcou- 
ples. What this illustrates is that the 
legal limits of "spouse" are malleable 
if and when there is a strong enough 
desire to change it. 
Ifwe wish to obtain freedom in the 
face of the word's inlexclusive means 
to rule we must interrogate the 
boundaries of meaning each of us 
reinforces whenever we accept or 
change what a sign signifies. Ulti- 
mately, we areideologically complicit 
whenever we imagine a word "just 
means" anything because the crea- 
tion of every word is predicated upon 
judgments that don't necessarily or 
innocently reflect reality. In many 
senses, freedom really does lie in the 
power to define and limit meaning, 
thus it is imperative to understand 
that you may well be agreeing to limit 
your own and other's rights simply 
because you unquestioningly accept, 
fiercely defend, andlor alter the defi- 
nition ofa word. So remember, "ifall 
we are talking about is semantics" is 
precisely the point! 
Frances Latchfordgrew up in Toronto 
and is presently working on her PhD. 
in Philosophy a t  York. 
l ~ ~ w i l l f u l  I mean some decisions are 
made because they will effectively 
serve as a means of social control 
which is what the "spouse" vs. 
"domestic partner" debate illustrates. 
2What this also depicts is that "reverse 
discourses" are equally dependent 
upon common agreement for any 
wide scale effect. 
3 ~ o r  a thorough discussion oflikeness 
as astandard, although not in relation 
to words, see MacKinnon (37). 
 o or a philosophical discussion of 
how and why language serves to 
obfuscate difference by merely 
reflecting reality see Kierkegaard 
(168). 
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